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Industrial Agglomeration and Wage Inequality in China 
 
Abstract: This paper estimates nonlinear structural wage equations derived from NEG 
models with data on 327 cities in China. The estimation results show that the variation of 
wage level across cities in China is associated with proximity to large markets. The 
estimated elasticity of substitution of China is smaller than those of the other countries 
studied in previous research. It indicates that with the same increase of sub-regional 
market size, China may suffer more serious regional inequality problems. My estimation 
shows that although increased agglomeration can increase each city’s wage level, it may 
also increase the wage gap between large and small cities. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of its open door policy in 1978, China’s economy has grown 
spectacularly for 30 years. From then to 2005, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
rose, in constant 2000 US$, from US $157.7 billion to US $1,889.9 billion,1 giving an 
average annual GDP growth rate of 9.6%. China’s exports and imports have grown even 
faster during the same period, with average annual growth rates of 12.6% and 13.3% 
respectively. Along with China’s rapid economic and trade expansion, multinational 
companies continue to move their labor-intensive production to China due to its abundant 
labor endowment. This further induces the huge flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
into China.  
                                                          
1 World Development Indicators, World Bank (2007).  
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However, the locations of China’s exporting industries and the destinations of 
FDI flowing into China have displayed significant spatial concentration in China. In 2006, 
over 31 percent of China’s exports were from Guangdong province and more than 75% 
of FDI flowed into its coastal regions. 2 It seems that it is China’s coastal regions that hold 
comparative advantage over many other countries as well as other regions of China, gain 
large world market share of labor-intensive products and absorb a huge amount of the 
world’s production resources [Tuan and Ng (2004)]. Labor-intensive economic activity is 
agglomerating in China’s coastal regions. 
One of the most important reasons that caused this agglomeration is believed to 
be the Chinese government’s reform strategy------ “let some people and some regions get 
rich first; the rich people and regions should then pull the rest of the country to get rich” 
[Deng, (1994)] and the corresponding economic policies3. Some preferential policies 
were implemented in China’s coastal region which sped up the development of those 
regions and made them more competitive and wealthier than the rest of the country. 4  
Tuan and Ng’s (2004) research indicates that the process of legal modernization 
and policy reforms via institutionalization, which has significantly lowered both domestic 
and international trade costs of China, has strong effects on China’s development 
distribution. Their study is based on Krugman’s (1991) well-known New Economic 
Geography (NEG) model----- the Core-Periphery (CP) model. The CP model shows that 
a larger economy, which has both a larger labor endowment and a larger local market, 
                                                          
2 Values are calculated from data in NBSC (2007). Please see Van Huffel, Luo and Catin (2005) for more 
detailed review on the concentration of economic activities in China. 
3 The role of China’s trade policies on firm location is discussed in Batisse and Poncet (2004) and Jin 
(2004). 
4  In general, preferential policies include preferential tax treatment and direct local authorization for 
approval of FDI utilization. Please see Tuan and Ng (2001) for more detail. 
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tends to be more attractive to manufactures due to the existence of economies of scale 
and trade costs. The concentration of manufactures in the larger economy increases the 
demand for labor and lifts its wage level. The higher wage level attracts more labor to the 
larger economy which further increases the larger economy’s labor endowment and local 
market size. The process continues until all manufactures agglomerates to the larger 
economy. Tuan and Ng’s conclusion supports the argument that institutional changes 
affected the distribution of economic activities in China. However, their study did not tell 
us whether the labor endowment and market size affected the distribution of economic 
activities as well as the regional wage levels in China as CP model predicted.  
In reality, the large population, and thus large potential market size and labor 
supply, is the most important reason that China’s development attracts extra attention and 
raises concerns. At the same time, the problem of sharp disparities in wages and income 
levels of households between coastal areas—where most business activities are located—
and inland provinces has been serious.5 This has induced the “floating” population of 
internal migrants seeking improved income, and the associated severe congestion and 
environmental problems. All these problems have threatened the continuance of China’s 
economic development. In this paper, I study the interaction of China’s regional labor 
endowment, market size and wage level from a NEG perspective. 
Much NEG empirical work has been done to study the effect of agglomeration on 
wage levels and the regional income (market size). Two methods that are widely used are 
the market-potential method [Brakman, Garretsen and schramm (2003), Hanson (2005)] 
and the market-access method [Redding and Venables’s (2004)]. Hanson derives a full 
                                                          
5 The role of trade opening in altering economic disparities in China is assessed in Anderson et al. (2003). 
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structural equation of wage based on Helpman’s (1998) NEG model and estimates the 
wage equation with US data on employment, income, and housing stocks as right-hand 
side variables. On the other hand, Redding and Venables (2004) estimate the cross-
country correlation between per capita income and the proximity to demand and supply 
markets, where the latter is constructed from estimated parameters of a gravity model of 
trade. Due to the lack of data on sub-regional trade within China, I use Hanson’s method 
in this paper.  
2. Literature Review 
There are also other empirical works on spatial distribution of economic activities 
within China. Based on provincial data from 1988 to 1997, Catin and Van Huffel (2003) 
test two hypotheses: 1) whether the openness has reinforced a polarization process that 
characterized the second stage of development, 2) whether the progressive specialization 
in high-tech industries leads to a diffusion of the labor intensive activities to the inland 
provinces. Their results show that high-tech industries are concentrated highly in the 
coastal provinces. At the same time, the concentration in labor-intensive industries 
decelerates or even decreases in the coastal region. But this movement is just from the 
more developed coastal provinces to the less developed coastal provinces and does not 
significantly modify the major trends of the location and specialization of industries in 
the inland region. This finding provides strong support for the importance of my study. 
First of all, it confirms that the concentration of economic activities does exist in the 
different development stages of China at both sub-regional and national levels. Secondly, 
their empirical tests focus on the effects of the gradual open-door policies and the inflow 
of FDI on the spatial distribution of the Chinese economy. They do not analyze the 
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detailed market potential or market access. How well the NEG framework can work for 
the case of China still needs to be tested. Finally, the data they use is at the provincial 
level for the period 1988-97. However, the rural-urban disparity and the hierarchy of 
cities may make the welfare effect of the concentration more significant [Brakman et. al. 
(2005)]. At the same time, their study is based on an immobile labor assumption, but the 
extent of labor mobility in China has increased since 1990s.6 This suggests that their 
conclusions may change substantially with a data update.  
Au and Henderson (2002) estimate the relationship between city-level per capita 
output in the non-agricultural sector and several determinants: capital stock to labor ratio, 
share of accumulated FDI in capital stock, distance to the coast, education and scale 
measures (city employment, employment squared, and employment interacted with the 
manufacturing to service ratio). They divide the data into the 1990-92 "planning" period 
and the 1995-97 "market" period and regress separately. Their results confirm that worker 
productivity is shown to be an inverted U-shape function of the city employment level, 
with the peak point shifting out as industrial composition moves from the manufacturing 
sector to the service sector as predicted by urban theory. They also argue that the majority 
of Chinese cities are shown to be potentially undersized – below the lower bound on the 
95% confidence interval of the size where their output per worker peaks – and so there 
could be large gains from increased agglomeration in both the rural industrial and urban 
sectors. The purpose of Au and Henderson’s study is close to my empirical study. I want 
to test the effect of agglomeration on wage levels at the city level. However, our methods 
are quite different since I will use the nonlinear structural model derived from the NEG 
                                                          
6 Please see Huang and Zhan (2005) for detail. 
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models. Instead of just estimating the linear relationships between per capita output and 
its determinants, I can estimate the structural parameters such as elasticity of substitution, 
share of industrial production in national production, share of capital in the industrial 
production and the trading cost parameter.  
According to the above literature, China continues to face regional disparity 
problems caused by the concentration of economic activities. The factors that affect the 
spatial distribution and regional wage disparity of the Chinese economy are economic 
openness, industrialization, agglomeration, other factors or the combination of these 
factors. The effect of agglomeration has not yet been checked. Therefore, I try to explain 
the regional wage disparity in China from the NEG perspective in this paper.  
3. The Model 
3.1. The Wage Equation: 
Based on Helpman’s (1998) economic geography model, Hanson (2005) set up a 
full structural approach to consider wages inequalities in the economic geography 
framework. Basically, Helpman’s model is very close to Krugman (1991)’s CP model 
and the functional equilibrium relationships look very similar for the two models. 
However, there is still an essential difference, as mentioned by Hanson, which makes the 
Helpman model more favorable for empirical work: Helpman uses housing, a sector with 
non-tradable products and exogenously fixed endowment to replace the agricultural 
sector in Krugman’s CP model. As industrialization continues, the share of expenditure 
on agricultural products decreases, which weakens the importance of the agricultural 
sector to the economy substantially, especial in the urban area. However, the effect of 
housing on the economy will be relatively more stable across time, thus reduce the 
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disturbance caused by factors other than the agglomeration effect. Since my study is 
based on China’s city-level data, I use Helpman’s model rather than Krugman’s basic CP 
model in the following estimations. This can also make my estimation more comparable 
with Hanson’s. 
 I assume that all consumers have identical Cobb–Douglas preferences over two 
bundles of goods, tradable manufacturing goods and housing services. A representative 
consumer in region k solves the problem:  
Max Uk = μμ− MkHk CC
1         (3.1) 
s.t. =+ MkMkHkHk CPCP Yk,        (3.2) 
where HkC , MkC  are consumption of non-tradable housing services and traded 
manufactures in country k respectively. MxP , HkP , kY  are the price of manufactures, the 
housing price and the total output in country k.  
The production function of manufactures is defined as: 
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intermediate manufactures used in region k, kK is the capital used by region k, n  is the 
number of varieties of intermediate manufactures consumed by region k and σ > 1 is the 
elasticity of substitution7 among varieties. To reflect the effects of both comparative 
                                                          
7I follow Ethier's (1982) assumption that the work of aggregating varieties can also be considered as a 
variety, so there is no extra labor needed in the aggregation production. 
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advantage and diminishing marginal returns, two variable inputs, labor and capital, are 
involved in the production of manufactures.8 It is different from Helpman’s model which 
only includes labor in manufacture production. 
The production of an intermediate variety involves a fixed cost and a constant 
marginal cost: to produce ix  of good i, we need ii xL βα +=  ( 0>α , 0>β ), where Li is 
the amount of labor employed to produce good i. Therefore, there are increasing returns 
in production of each intermediate manufacturing variety. In equilibrium, each variety is 
produced by a single monopolistically competitive firm and the f.o.b price of variety i 
produced in region j is jij wp β⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−σ
σ=
1
, where jw  is the nominal wage in region j. 
There are J regions, K capital and L laborers in total, where laborers and capital 
are mobile across regions. With iceberg transportation costs in shipping goods between 
regions, the c.i.f price of good i produced by region j and sold in region k is  
jkd
ijijk epp
τ=          (3.4) 
where τ  is the unit transportation cost and jkd  is the distance between region  j and k. 
Given the symmetry of intermediate manufactures in production and the mobile capital, 
the total sales of manufacturing goods by region j are9  
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8 For more details, please see Li (2008). 
9 Since the capital return is the same between regions but we have “iceberg” trade costs for any trade of 
manufactures, the trade of final manufactures will actually not happen. Please see Li (2008) for details. 
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where ijkc is the amount of variety i that region k purchases from region j, r is the nominal 
return to capital. Monopolistically competitive firms earn zero profits. Therefore, the 
manufacturing sales in region j equal wages paid to labor in j, which is σanw jj . We then 
can get the following function for wage: 
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where θ is a function of fixed parameters. This equation indicates that wages in a region 
are increasing in the income of surrounding locations, decreasing in capital return, 
decreasing in transportation costs to these locations, and increasing in the price of 
competing traded goods in these locations. The summation term measures the market 
potential of the region.  
Since labor can move freely across regions, real wages are equalized. Thus we 
have  
kj
PP
w
PP
w
MkHk
k
MjHj
j ≠∀δ== μμ−μμ− ,11       (3.7) 
where δ  is the equalized real wage.  
In equilibrium, we also have housing payments equal housing expenditure, 
kHkHk YCP )1( μ−= .        (3.8) 
From equation (3.6)-(3.8), I can derive a wage equation similar to Hanson’s wage 
equation:11 
                                                          
11 Hanson’s (2005) wage equation is 
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Parameters B1-B6 are reduced form coefficients to measure the effects of nearby region 
income, housing stock, wages, distance, capital return and real wage levels. 
From equation (3.9), we can see that an increase in the return to capital will 
decrease the nominal wage. At the same time, higher income in nearby regions raises 
demand for traded goods produced in j (as long as bμμσ +−− 1)1)(( >0 is satisfied) 12, 
and higher wages in nearby regions raise the relative price of traded goods produced in 
these regions, which also increases the demand for goods produced in j. The higher 
demand further increases the production in region j and raises the region’s demand for 
labor and its nominal wages. In addition, larger housing stocks in nearby regions imply 
lower housing prices and higher employment in these regions and so higher nominal 
wage needed for region j to attract more labor. Finally, the summation expression 
measures the market potential of region j. The greater market potential a region has, the 
higher its wage level is. 
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4. Data and Estimations 
4.1. Data Sources 
I take cities in China as the geographic unit of analysis. The data required are 
wages, population, regional income, housing stocks and distance between cities. Data on 
distance between cities are driving distances in thousand kilometers downloaded from 
www.hua2.com (China Map Online). I measure a city’s wage level by its average annual 
wage (in RMB yuan). The regional income is measured by each city’s GDP in hundred 
million RMB yuan. Total personal housing area in square meter is used as proxy of 
housing stock. City-level data on average annual wage, population, GDP and per capita 
housing area are available in the China City Statistical Yearbook from 1990 to 2001 
(They have stopped reporting the per capita housing area since 2002). Table 1 gives 
summary statistics on the variables. There are 327 cities. But data for some cities are 
missing in some years.  
Table 1. Statistical Summary of Variables 
Variables GDP GDP GDP Population Population Population
Year 2000 1995 1990 2000 1995 1990
Obs. 262.00 262.00 209.00 262.00 261.00 210.00
Mean 190.24 101.20 35.63 124.13 104.76 104.05
Standard Deviation 409.28 212.27 72.29 244.79 168.01 167.67
Skewness 6.48 7.05 6.77 8.62 6.55 5.94
Variables housing housing housing Wage Wage Wage
Year 2000 1995 1990 2000 1995 1990
Obs. 260.00 219.00 203.00 262.00 262.00 209.00
Mean 1,706.23 861.12 681.91 8,986.40 5,325.81 2,259.39
Standard Deviation 2,690.98 1,255.49 990.86 2,729.91 1,520.76 433.35
Skewness 7.10 6.13 6.10 1.60 1.41 1.57  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in China City Statistical Yearbook (1990-2000)  
Table 1 shows that the Pearson Index for GDP, Population and Housing Stock are 
far greater than 1, i.e., the distributions of these variables are positively skewed. 
Therefore, for the majority of the cities, the values of these variables are below average. 
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It means that the population and economic activities are concentrated in a small number 
of the cities. 
To further check the concentration and agglomeration of economic activities in 
China, I calculate the Concentration and Agglomeration Theil indices (Theil, 1967) with 
city level data of 30 Provincial Capitals and Separate Planning Cities in 2004. The 
Concentration index is defined as follows [Brakman, et al. (2005)]:  
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     (3.11) 
where f is an industry index, 
r is a region index, 
R is the total number of regions, 
f
rx is the economic activity of industry f in region r, 
fx is total economic activity of industry f , ∑
r
f
rx , 
rn is the number of basic units of region r and 
n is the total number of basic units, ∑
r
rn . 
fT  compares each region r’s relative economic activity of industry f  ( ffr xx / ) 
with what it should have been on the basis of the relative number of basic units ( nnr / ). 
The basic units can be land area, population, economic activity, sub-regions, etc. If the 
industry is proportionally represented, ffr xx / = nnr / , 
fT  will be 0; if the industry is 
over represented, ffr xx / > nnr / , 
f
rT will be a positive number; if the industry is under 
represented, ffr xx / < nnr / , 
f
rT will be a negative number. The logarithmic 
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transformation and the weights guarantee that fT  increases in the inequality of the 
distribution of fx  with respect to n. 
The agglomeration Theil index is: 
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where, rx is total economic activity of region r , x is the total economic activity 
of the whole nation∑
=
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, rn is the number of basic units of region r and n is the total  
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Table 2. Agglomeration and Concentration Indices in 2004 China 
(Based on city-level data of Provincial Capitals and Separate Planning Cities) 
 
Region  City 
Economic 
Agglomeration 
based on 
regional GDP 
Industrial 
Concentration 
Agglomeration 
of Employment 
 
 
North 
  Beijing      3.79 5.48 13.54 
  Tianjin      1.66 6.57 1.24 
  Shijiazhuang -1.06 -1.37 -1.27 
  Taiyuan      -0.27 -0.32 0.97 
  Hohhot      0.00 -0.33 -0.03 
   Shenyang    0.55 -0.68 -0.24 
Northeast   Changchun   -0.35 -0.51 -0.55 
   Harbin       -1.07 -1.70 0.56 
 
 
 
East 
  Shanghai     12.64 26.75 2.52 
  Nanjing      1.23 3.88 -0.03 
  Hangzhou    2.46 5.77 -0.60 
  Hefei        -0.69 -0.72 -0.69 
  Fuzhou      0.21 -0.07 -0.37 
  Nanchang    -0.55 -0.81 -0.48 
  Jinan        0.47 0.16 -0.27 
 
 
 
Middle 
  Zhengzhou   -0.41 -0.89 -0.42 
  Wuhan       0.18 -0.79 0.69 
  Changsha    -0.56 -1.07 -0.74 
  Guangzhou   7.09 7.63 3.22 
  Nanning     -1.14 -0.87 -1.01 
  Haikou      -0.15 -0.23 0.10 
 
 
Southwest 
  Chongqing   -5.54 -5.18 -5.45 
  Chengdu     -0.62 -1.86 -0.98 
  Guiyang     -0.56 -0.60 0.20 
  Kunming     -0.45 -0.81 -0.15 
 
 
West 
  Xi'an        -1.00 -1.28 0.22 
  Lanzhou     -0.38 -0.32 0.30 
  Xining       -0.36 -0.36 -0.28 
  Yinchuan     -0.21 -0.23 0.32 
  Urumqi      0.09 -0.16 0.78 
 Agglomeration/ 
Concentration 
Index 
14.99 35.11 11.10 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in China Statistical Yearbook (2005) 
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number of basic units, ∑
r
rn . Here, the basic unit can only be regions, population or 
area. 
There are three kinds of indices shown in Table 2. The Economic Agglomeration 
indices use Regional GDP to measure the economic activities. The Industrial 
Concentration indices use regional industrial output to measure the industrial activities. 
The Employment Agglomeration indices use regional employment to measure the 
regional economic activities. All three indices use population as the basic unit. The city 
level data of the provincial capitals and the separate planning cities are used in 
calculation. 
From the table we can see that the spatial concentration of economic activities is 
very significant in China. All three indices are greater than 10 at the national level. In 
general, more economic production (GDP) is located in Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Beijing compared with other cities. Industrial activities are mostly concentrated in 
Shanghai, while employment is agglomerated mostly in Beijing. 
Table 1 also shows that the distribution of average annual wage level is positively 
skewed, although it is not as significant as the distribution of the other three variables. 
According to the NEG model, a few cities, which have concentrated population and labor 
supply, will have higher than national average wages. The rest, majority of the cities will 
have lower than national average wages. Therefore, the skewness of wage level’s 
distribution is consistent with NEG model’s prediction.  
4.2. Estimation Issues 
The first issue is the measurement error problem. The desired city wage measure 
is for a worker with some constant level of skill. According to the NEG theory, the 
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variation in the constant skill wage across locations reflects the regional variation in 
nominal wages caused by the spatial variation in industry location. However, the 
available wage measure is the average annual wage per worker of each city. The variation 
in city average wages may be due either to the variation in the constant skill wage or to 
variation in worker characteristics. At the same time, the city with favorable 
characteristics, such as convenient transportation, the presence of universities or 
preferential policies, may attract both industrial firms and more-skilled labor, therefore 
any correlation between wages and the market-potential may be a byproduct of a 
correlation between the city’s labor skill level and the market-potential. For instance, a 
city with more universities may have relatively large supplies of skilled workers (because 
college graduates tend to look for jobs near their place of education) and relatively large 
concentrations of production (because students and faculty are a captive local market).To 
reduce the effect of measurement error mentioned above, Hanson (2005) takes time 
differences of the estimating equations. I follow his method and get the following 
specification for Eq. (3.9), 
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It can be written in reduced form: 
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The time difference removes the effect of city characteristics that vary little over 
time, such as the availability of agricultural land, convenient transportation, the presence 
of universities or preferential policies. Equation (3.13) should still be able to reflect the 
effects of economic activities, such as the factor movement, international trade and 
production relocation. 
In Hanson’s paper, the real wage is implicitly treated as constant and canceled out 
when taking the time difference. He gets the following wage equation: 
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Due to the complete labor mobility assumption, real wage (δ) is equalized across 
regions. However, it is not necessarily constant across time.  From equation (3.7), we can 
have 
( ) ( ) ( )( )μ −μ−−μμ−−− −−−=δ−δ 11 1111 lnlnlnlnlnln MtHtMtHttttt PPPPww    (3.17) 
From equation (3.17) we can see that the time difference of δln  is the difference 
between the nominal wage inflation and the price index inflation. These two inflations 
can be different for the same year and the term 1tt δδ −− lnln  can have non-zero value. 
Therefore, the term with real wage should be kept in the time difference equation. Since δ 
is constant across cities, 1tt δδ −− lnln  is also constant across cities. Therefore, I use 
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national real wage level to calculate the time difference of real wage. Similarly, I use the 
national nominal lending interest rate to calculate the time difference of rln 13. 
The remaining error term, itvΔ , is the change in the deviation of city average 
wages from city constant-skill wages. Hanson mentioned that this error term may be 
correlated with the change in the summation expression in equation (3.9), if regions that 
experience growth in demand for locally produced traded goods tend to attract workers 
with above average skills. To account for the possible correlation between the error term 
and the change in the summation expression, Hanson uses a GMM estimator with 
historical data on regional population growth lagged by 10 years or more as the 
instrument for the change in the summation. Due to the limit of data availability, I use 
nonlinear least square estimator in Stata 9.1 with the city population growth data lagged 
only 5 years as the instrument.14 
The second estimation issue is that other factors that influence spatial 
agglomeration, such as supplies of FDI (Tuan and Ng, 2003, 2004), or the available 
exogenous amenities (Roback, 1982) or localized human-capital externalities (Rauch, 
1993), may also influence the spatial distribution of nominal wages. I deal with this issue 
by including three control variables in the estimation: annual utilized FDI, changes in the 
share of the tertiary industry in a city’s GDP and higher educated population.15 Due to the 
data limitation, I cannot use measures of exogenous amenities mentioned by Roback 
                                                          
13 The data for real wage and nominal lending interest rate are available in China Statistical Yearbook 
(1990-2001). 
14 Stata does not have nonlinear GMM estimator. But it provides a more general nonlinear estimator, nl, 
which can fit an arbitrary nonlinear function to the dependent variable by least squares. 
15 According to China Statistical Yearbook, economic activities are categorized into the following three 
strata of industry: Primary industry refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and 
services in support of these industries. Secondary industry refers to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
production and supply of electricity, water and gas, and construction. Tertiary industry refers to all other 
economic activities not included in the primary or secondary industries. 
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(1982), such as heating-degree days, cooling-degree days, average possible sunshine, etc. 
The amenities can be very important advantages for the development of the service 
industry in a city. Therefore, I use the changes in the share of the service industry in a 
city’s GDP as proxy for the exogenous amenities. By regressing city average wage 
growth on city education, the specification captures the impact of both individual 
education and average city education on wages, which implicitly controls for human-
capital externalities across workers within a city (Rauch, 1993). The city level data for 
utilized FDI, share of third industry in GDP and the higher educated population are also 
available in the China City Statistical Yearbook. 
Other factors, such as technological spillovers, may also contribute to spatial 
agglomeration. Using external economies to explain spatial agglomeration has a long 
history in urban economics (Fujita and Thisse, 1996). However, spillovers tend to be 
assumed rather than derived in these models. As Hanson (2005) has mentioned, although 
spillovers between firms could certainly contribute to spatial agglomeration, the absence 
of microfoundations for this explanation perhaps makes it less compelling. Part of the 
appeal of the NEG models is that the pecuniary externalities arise endogenously through 
the incorporated scale economies at the firm level.  
As China is an economy in transition, the structures of its production and 
consumption are both changing. This implies that the parameters in my structural wage 
equations, such as the elasticity of substitution, the share of housing expenditure in 
annual living expenses and the share of labor cost in industrial production, may not be the 
same for different years. Therefore, I estimate the equation for each individual year and 
check if there is any trend for the change of these parameters. 
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4.3. Estimation Results 
Hanson estimated the reduced-form regression coefficient of the wage equation 
first. Then he derived the implied structural parameter. When I performed the nonlinear 
regression following Hanson’s strategy, the R2 values are smaller than 0.3 in most years, 
which are similar to Hanson’s results.16 But if I estimate the structural parameter directly, 
the R2 increases to more than 0.5 in most cases, which means a great improvement in the 
fit of the regression. Table 3 and Table 4 report the direct nonlinear least squares 
estimation results for wage equations (3.15) and (3.13) respectively. The dependent 
variable is the log change in average annual wage. I report both the structural parameter 
estimates and the values of the reduced-form regression coefficient implied by these 
estimates. Consider first the fit of the regression. In Table 4, all structural parameters for 
my wage equation are precisely estimated with values within the theoretical range. 
However, Table 3 shows that for some years, Hanson’s equation does not converge to the 
significant estimates with theoretically correct values. For the years 1993, 1996 and 1999, 
Hanson’s method does not produce significant estimates for μ, the share of industrial 
consumption in total consumption, between 0 and 1.  For the years 1991 and 1995, I find 
insignificant estimates for τ (>0), the unit transportation cost. As a result, the implied 
estimates for some of the reduced-form regression coefficients in equation (3.15) are not 
significant in these years. For the years 1990 and 1992, although the structural parameter 
estimates are significant within the theoretical value region, the implied reduced-form 
regression coefficients for regional personal income have the wrong sign. The reduced-
form effects of personal income, wages and housing on market potential implied by my 
                                                          
16 Please see APPENDIX for Hanson (2005)’s results.  
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wage equation, however, are broadly consistent with the Krugman model in all 11 years. 
Higher personal income, higher wages and higher housing stocks in surrounding 
locations are all associated with higher wages in a given city. Comparing values of the 
Akaike's information criterion (AIC), Schwarz criterion (BIC) and R2 in Table 3 and 
Table 4, we see that my wage equation improves the fit of the regression in 6 of the 11 
years. Therefore, in the following analysis, I focus only on results in Table 4. In 
unreported results, I performed the estimation with data excluding Provincial Capitals 
and Separate Planning Cities. The results are very similar to those for the full sample. 
Table 5 and Table 6 report results including controls for used FDI, human capital and 
exogenous amenities for the year 1991 and 1995-2001 (Time difference data for 1992 - 
1994 are not available). These results are qualitatively similar to those without controls. 
Consider next the value of the structural parameter estimates in Table 4. 
Consistent with theory, estimates of σ, the elasticity of substitution, are greater than 1. It 
ranges in value between 1 and 3 in most cases. This is roughly in line with Hanson’s 
estimates based on Helpman’s model (range between 2 and 4) but far below his estimates 
based on Krugman’s model (range between 4 and 8). As Hanson has mentioned, recent 
estimates of σ in the empirical literature are concentrated between 4.0 and 9.0 (e.g., 
Feenstra 1994, Head and Ries, 2001), which is a range above the estimates in Table 4. 
The lower is the value of σ, the lower in absolute value is the own-price elasticity of 
demand for any individual good and the less competitive is the market for that good. 
Therefore, my estimation results indicate that the Chinese market is less competitive than 
the markets in the countries studied in previous research (such as the U.S. market). At the 
same time, the change of the estimated σ is not monotonic. This can be explained with 
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two opposite effects of the trade across sub-regions. First, the trade diversifies varieties 
available in each region. As the number of varieties increases, the elasticity of 
substitution among varieties increase and the market is more competitive. On the other 
hand, as trade continues, each region will specialize in the industries that they have 
comparative advantage. For example, in the early years, almost every Chinese city had 
cloth producers. After years of trade and specialization, the cloth production concentrated 
in only a few cities now. The concentration of production decreases the market 
competition and the elasticity of substitution. I also find that the estimated σ for the years 
after 1997 are smaller than those for the years before 1997. It indicates that the 
specialization in specific industry may have made the sub-regions of China lose their 
diversification in intermediate inputs in the period of 1998-2001.  
The estimates of μ, the expenditure share on traded goods, are between 0 and 1. 
This is also consistent with theory. With the ongoing urban housing reform and the 
associated increasing housing price and expenditure for Chinese household, the estimated 
values for μ of 0.82–0.99 may seem too high. This may be due to the restricted 
categorization of goods as either traded consumables or housing services as Hanson 
suggested. On the other hand, before the launch of China’s urban housing reform, 
housing expenditure comprised less than 1 percent of a Chinese urban resident’s annual 
salary or living expenses (Chen, 1996). After more than two decades’ privatization and 
marketization, China’s housing market today is still far from mature (Li and Yi, 2007). 
The 2000 Population Census of China shows that 41% of the owned homes were so 
called “fanggai fang”, referring to homes bought from “work units” (most are state-
owned enterprises or institutions) or the municipal housing bureau at subsidized prices. 
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Nine percent were “jingji shiyong fang”, which is a special kind of commodity housing 
that developers are asked to build for low- and middle-income households. Only 13% of 
the owned homes were bought in the open market by individual households. The 
remaining 37% were self-built housing found mostly in middle-sized and small cities. 
Therefore, the low share of housing expenditure in Chinese household’s living expense is 
reasonable to some extent. We can also see that the estimated values of μ after 1997 are 
lower than those before 1997. 17 This decreasing trend reflects the Chinese government’s 
effort at further reforming the housing market.18  
Estimated values of b, the share of labor cost in manufacturing production are 
between 0.7 and 1, which is consistent with the fact that the Chinese economy is labor 
intensive. There is also a rough decreasing trend for estimated values of b, especially 
when comparing the values after the year 1997 with those before 1997. China is 
transitioning towards a more capital intensive economy. If there are more data available 
for years after 2000, we may be able to see this decreasing trend clearer. Finally, the 
estimated values of τ, the unit transport costs, are much lower than those in Hanson’s 
estimations. It may be caused by the Chinese government’s heavy subsidy on gas 
consumption before 2000.  
Table 4 also shows that the implied reduced-form coefficient estimates for market 
potential and neighbor cities’ regional income increased during the studied period while 
those for distance, neighbor cities’ wage level and housing stock, the national capital 
                                                          
17 The estimation based on 1997’s data appears abnormal when comparing with estimations for other years. 
The estimated values for structural function parameters are much higher than those for other years. The R2 
value is very low (lower than 0.05). The reason can be the low quality of data or the effect of a shock such 
as 1997 crisis, or something else. It needs further study in future. Therefore, I do not count the estimation 
results for 1997 when doing trend analysis in this paper. 
18 In 1997, Chinese government launched a series of new policies for further urban housing reform. For 
more details, please see Li and Yi (2007). 
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return and wage level decreased during the same period. It indicates that the effect of 
market potential and neighbor cities’ regional income on a city’s wage level is increasing, 
which is consistent with the Krugman model’s prediction. If there are no other factors to 
impede this effect, it will continue until all economic activities agglomerate into one big 
city. Capital return and real wage level have negative effects on a city’s wage level. But 
their effects are decreasing in China as shown in Table 4.  
In unreported results, I estimate equation (3.13) with data on regional population 
growth lagged by 3-5 years as the instrument for the change in the summation. The 
including of instruments does not improve the estimates of structural parameters much. 
But the values of R2 decrease dramatically to around 0.1. It may be caused by the low 
quality instruments since I do not have data of city population growth lagged by a longer 
period (10 or more years) as Hanson used. 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
In this paper, I use data on 327 cities in China to estimate nonlinear wage 
equations derived from NEG models. These models attribute the geographic 
concentration of economic activities to product-market linkages between regions that 
result from scale economies and transport costs. My estimation results are broadly 
consistent with this hypothesis. Regional variation in wages is associated with proximity 
to large markets.  
One contribution of the paper is estimation of a structural wage equation and the 
parameters such as the elasticity of substitution, the share of housing expenditure in a 
Chinese urban resident’ s annual living expenses and the share of labor cost in industrial 
production in China. Estimates of the model’s parameters are broadly consistent with 
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theory. The estimated elasticity of substitution of China is smaller than those of the other 
countries studied in previous research. It indicates that the effect of market potential, and 
therefore the agglomeration effect, is greater in China than in other countries. Thus, with 
the same increase of sub-regional market size, China may suffer more serious regional 
inequality problems. The estimation results also show that the estimated values of 
elasticity of substitution for the years after 1997 are smaller than those for the years 
before 1997. The reason could be that most small and middle-sized cities specialize in 
just a few industries with specific technology. Each city obtains strong market power in 
their specialized industries. But at the same time, each city loses its diversity of 
production. As a result, the elasticity of substitution on intermediate products decreases in 
these small and middle sized cities, which indicates a stronger market potential effect. 
This further accelerates the increase of wage difference between cities and the 
agglomeration of each industry into the city with the strongest technology and market 
power in that industry. Therefore, increasing small cities’ economic sizes and 
diversifying their industry composition may help decrease the wage inequality between 
cities in China. Au and Henderson (2002) also argue that the majority of Chinese cities 
should increase their economic size to reach the output per worker peaks. They further 
state that there could be large gains from increased agglomeration in both the rural 
industrial and urban sectors. However, my estimation shows that although increased 
agglomeration can increase each city’s wage level, it may also increase the wage gap 
between large and small cities.  
Similar to Hanson’s study, my estimations, of course, do not rule out the 
possibility that other factors also contribute to spatial agglomeration. My estimation 
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results are not qualitatively affected by introducing controls for FDI, human capital 
externalities or exogenous amenities or by instrumenting for the market-potential term. 
But there are still other factors, such as the technology spillovers between firms, for 
which I do not control and which could have important effects on industry location. 
My estimation results also show that the share of housing expenditure in a 
Chinese urban resident’s annual living expenses is still very low, although the housing 
prices in some major Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai now exceed those in 
many US cities. This share will increase in the near future, as China’s urban housing 
reform is going on and the share of the population who obtain homes at lower than 
market price from the old housing institution is decreasing. The estimated share of capital 
cost in industrial production is also very low, which is consistent with the fact that the 
Chinese economy is labor intensive. But the roughly increasing trend shows that China is 
transitioning towards a more capital intensive economy. 
There are still some of the concerns about the empirical results. They can 
conceivably be remedied through improving data quality or generalizing the NEG model, 
such as by introducing more heterogeneity in industry production and trade costs or by 
allowing for other motivations for spatial agglomeration. 
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Table 3. Nonlinear Least Square Estimation Results for Hanson's Wage Equation without Wage Control 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
σ 4.54 3.20 2.96 2.17 5.48 2.15 2.21 1.46 1.14 2.81 4.24
(0.116) (0.288) (0.149) (0.072) (0.200) (0.056) (0.348) (0.079) (0.124) (0.272) (0.382)
τ 0.45 0.00 0.90 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.08 3.22 4.91 0.05 0.18
(0.021) (0.034) (0.083) (0.052) (0.014) (0.053) (0.138) (0.580) (3.778) (0.042) (0.029)
μ 0.70 0.70 0.57 1.00 0.93 0.96 1.00 0.52 0.35 1.00 0.93
(0.006) (0.043) (0.017) (0.027) (0.007) (0.021) (0.015) (0.041) (0.183) (0.010) (0.005)
Implied values
Market potential 0.22 0.31 0.34 0.46 0.18 0.47 0.45 0.68 0.88 0.36 0.24
(0.006) (0.028) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012) (0.071) (0.037) (0.095) (0.034) (0.021)
Regional income (B1) -0.51 0.06 -0.50 1.00 0.65 0.96 1.00 0.58 0.73 1.00 0.74
(0.029) (0.099) (0.045) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.018) (0.008) (0.023) (0.018) (0.038)
Housing stock (B2) 1.51 0.94 1.50 0.00 0.35 0.04 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.26
(0.029) (0.099) (0.045) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.018) (0.008) (0.023) (0.018) (0.038)
wages (B3) 5.04 3.14 3.46 1.17 4.83 1.19 1.21 0.88 0.41 1.81 3.50
(0.130) (0.258) (0.174) (0.073) (0.203) (0.057) (0.365) (0.083) (0.144) (0.272) (0.417)
distance (B4) -1.59 0.00 -1.77 -0.20 -0.71 0.00 -0.09 -1.49 -0.69 -0.09 -0.60
(0.051) (0.074) (0.080) (0.062) (0.070) (0.060) (0.169) (0.071) (0.154) (0.071) (0.072)
Obs. 29975 30691 31099 31099 38322 38322 33489 33141 34053 37069 33447
Adj. R2 0.78 0.34 0.62 0.88 0.76 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.30 0.59 0.52
Log likelihood 50542 11404 9812 27349 38273 32499 6493 18300 13381 35874 15883
AIC -101077 -22803 -19619 -54692 -76541 -64992 -12980 -36594 -26756 -71743 -31761
BIC -101052 -22778 -19594 -54667 -76515 -64967 -12955 -36569 -26730 -71717 -31735
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in China Statistical Yearbook and China City Statistical Yearbook  (1990-2001)  
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Table 4. Nonlinear Least Square Estimation Results for My Wage Equation without Wage Control 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
σ 2.41 3.07 2.73 2.99 2.23 2.31 5.24 1.50 1.03 1.37 1.03
(0.008) (0.045) (0.032) (0.027) (0.012) (0.015) (0.162) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
τ 0.10 0.06 1.10 0.08 0.10 0.11 2.56 0.02 0.20 0.13 0.16
(0.001) (0.002) (0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.096) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
μ 0.91 0.82 0.97 0.89 0.90 0.92 1.00 0.46 0.88 0.89 0.84
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
b 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.99 0.72 0.80 0.89 0.84
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Implied values
Market potential 0.41 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.45 0.43 0.19 0.67 0.97 0.73 0.97
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Regional income (B1) 0.84 0.52 0.94 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.99 0.19 0.99 0.95 0.99
(0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing stock (B2) 0.16 0.48 0.06 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.05 0.01
(0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
wages (B3) 1.68 2.65 1.84 2.34 1.48 1.52 4.28 1.50 0.05 0.47 0.05
(0.009) (0.053) (0.034) (0.031) (0.014) (0.016) (0.164) (0.014) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
distance (B4) -0.14 -0.13 -1.91 -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 -10.87 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01
(0.001) (0.004) (0.049) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.358) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital return (B5) -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real wage (B6) -0.70 -0.86 -0.67 -0.79 -0.66 -0.66 -0.82 -1.00 -0.05 -0.34 -0.04
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Obs. 29975 30691 31099 31099 38322 38322 33489 33141 34053 37069 33447
Adj. R2 0.77 0.39 0.62 0.90 0.76 0.52 0.05 0.48 0.27 0.61 0.51
Log likelihood 50289 12545 9778 30776 38388 33448 7341 17868 12630 36868 15417
AIC -100570 -25082 -19548 -61543 -76769 -66887 -14675 -35728 -25253 -73727 -30825
BIC -100537 -25049 -19515 -61510 -76734 -66853 -14641 -35695 -25219 -73693 -30792
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in China Statistical Yearbook and China City Statistical Yearbook  (1990-2001)  
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Table 5. Nonlinear Least Square Estimation Results for Hanson's Wage Equation with Wage Control 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
σ 3.58 5.95 3.02 4.95 1.57 6.24 8.68 4.12
(0.045) (0.116) (0.091) (0.274) (0.032) (0.399) (0.191) (0.209)
τ 0.84 0.35 0.01 2.27 3.24 0.00 0.11 0.20
(0.020) (0.011) (0.005) (0.151) (0.192) (0.001) (0.005) (0.015)
μ 0.73 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.93 1.00 0.91
(0.004) (0.003) . . (0.013) (0.008) . (0.004)
Implied values
Market potential 0.28 0.17 0.33 0.20 0.64 0.16 0.12 0.24
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012)
Regional income (B1) 0.06 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.70
(0.017) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.041) (0.000) (0.020)
Housing stock (B2) 0.94 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.30
(0.017) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.041) (0.000) (0.020)
wages (B3) 3.52 5.29 2.02 3.95 0.94 5.62 7.68 3.42
(0.054) (0.123) (0.091) (0.274) (0.036) (0.404) (0.191) (0.223)
distance (B4) -2.17 -1.75 -0.03 -8.97 -1.85 0.00 -0.83 -0.63
(0.048) (0.051) (0.010) (0.419) (0.088) (0.004) (0.040) (0.053)
Obs. 18696 26345 29853 27945 27294 27160 30518 27847
Adj. R2 0.903 0.806 0.511 0.019 0.496 0.308 0.636 0.507
Log likelihood 39226.3 29752.1 25642.7 4035.75 14396.4 8781.74 31168.4 11598.1
AIC -78440.6 -59492.3 -51275.4 -8061.49 -28780.8 -17551.5 -62326.7 -23184.2
BIC -78393.6 -59443.2 -51233.9 -8020.3 -28731.5 -17502.2 -62285.1 -23134.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in China Statistical Yearbook and China City Statistical Yearbook  (1990-2001)  
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Table 6. Nonlinear Least Square Estimation Results for My Wage Equation with Wage Control 
 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
σ 1.97 2.10 2.44 4.92 1.53 1.07 1.48 1.05
(0.004) (0.011) (0.019) (0.175) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
τ 0.10 0.10 0.10 2.25 0.02 0.18 0.13 0.15
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.098) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
μ 0.91 0.90 0.92 1.00 0.61 0.88 0.90 0.85
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
b 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.99 0.65 0.85 0.89 0.81
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Implied values
Market potential 0.51 0.48 0.41 0.20 0.65 0.93 0.68 0.95
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
distance (B4) -0.10 -0.11 -0.15 -8.82 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.351) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional income (B1) 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.99 0.47 0.99 0.94 0.99
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
wages (B3) 1.18 1.33 1.66 3.95 1.35 0.10 0.60 0.08
(0.005) (0.012) (0.021) (0.176) (0.014) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Housing stock (B2) 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.53 0.01 0.06 0.01
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Capital return (B5) -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real wage (B6) -0.60 -0.63 -0.68 -0.80 -0.88 -0.09 -0.40 -0.07
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Obs. 18696 26345 29853 27945 27294 27160 30518 27847
Adj. R2 0.89 0.81 0.53 0.03 0.48 0.28 0.64 0.49
Log likelihood 38139 29738 26218 4192 14067 8163 31446 11224
AIC -76264 -59461 -52422 -8369 -28120 -16312 -62879 -22434
BIC -76209 -59404 -52364 -8312 -28063 -16255 -62820 -22376
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in China Statistical Yearbook and China City Statistical Yearbook  (1990-2001)  
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HANSON (2005)’S REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Hanson’s estimation of the wage equation based on Krugman’s model 
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Hanson’s estimation of the wage equation based on Helpman’s model 
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